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EVIDENCE - THE PENNSYLVANIA RAPE SHIELD LAW - ADMISSI-
BILITY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING SEXUAL CONDUCT OFFERED FOR
PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that testimony offered for the purpose of impeaching an
alleged rape victim's credibility does not fall within the "past sex-
ual conduct" provision of the Rape Shield Law when such evi-
dence concerns the alleged victim's provocative conduct during
and shortly after the alleged rape.
Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996).
On March 16, 1993, Officer Kevin Killen of the West Mead
Township Police Department was tried in the Crawford County
Court on charges of indecent assault,' attempted involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse2 and official oppression. 3 The charges
against Officer Killen were instituted pursuant to his connection
with a woman he previously stopped for traffic violations ("the
complainant").4
1. Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996). Pennsylvania's indecent
assault law is found in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (1995). This statute sets forth: "A per-
son who has indecent contact with the complainant or causes the complainant to have
indecent contact with the person is guilty of indecent assault if: 1) he does so without the
complainant's consent. . . ." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (1995).
2. Pennsylvania provides that involuntary deviate sexual intercourse occurs
when one has sexual intercourse with another person: "(1) by forcible compulsion; (2) by
threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable
resolution; (3) who is unconscious... ; [or] (5) who suffers from a mental disability which
renders him or her incapable of consent.. . ." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123 (1995).
3. Killen, 680 A.2d at 851. Pennsylvania law concerning official oppression is
located in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1995). The statute defines the term as follows:
Official Oppression. A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or
taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of
the second degree if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he: (1) subjects another to
arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or
other infringement of personal or property rights; or (2) denies or impedes another
in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1995).
4. Appellants Reproduced Record Vol. I-B at 43, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996)(No. 1992-851). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
part of the reproduced record on appeal, the citations in this note to the reproduced record
are cites to the portions of the record that were admitted at trial and not to those portions
that were the subject of the court's objection. Killen, 680 A.2d at 851.
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On August 19, 1992, Officer Killen had stopped the complain-
ant in front of her apartment for speeding.5 When Officer Killen
approached the complainant's automobile, he noticed that she
appeared to be intoxicated.6 In response to Officer Killen's
request for identification, the complainant stated that she did
not have her driver's license with her, but could retrieve it from
her apartment.7 Officer Killen then allegedly followed the com-
plainant into her apartment in order to retrieve the license.'
After entering the apartment, the complainant spent approxi-
mately five minutes in the bathroom.9 Upon exiting the bath-
room, she found Officer Killen in her children's bedroom. 10 When
the complainant confronted Officer Killen, he allegedly shoved
her onto a bed." The complainant testified that although she
freely left the bedroom and entered the living room, Officer Kil-
len followed her into the living room, sat next to her on the couch
and began to fondle her breasts.' 2 According to the complainant,
Officer Killen also pulled down his slacks and underwear and
demanded that the complainant perform oral sex.13 After the
complainant continuously refused Officer Killen's demands, he
5. Killen, 680 A.2d at 851. Officer Killen observed the complainant speeding in
West Mead Township, the township in which Officer Killen was a police officer. Appel-
lant's Reproduced Record Vol. I-B at 47, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa.
1996) (No. 1992-851). Officer Killen did not pull the complainant over, however, until she
was driving on Randolph Street in the city of Meadville. Id. at 48.
6. Killen, 680 A.2d at 852. During the trial, testimony revealed that the com-
plainant's blood alcohol content was approximately 0.193%. Id. at 851 n.2. The com-
plainant testified that she had been drinking at a bar and that within a five hour period,
she consumed many beers and approximately eight mixed drinks. Appellant's Repro-
duced Record Vol I-B at 44-45, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No.
1992-851). The complainant further testified that she thought she would be arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol because she knew that she was drunk. Id. at 49.
7. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol I-B at 49, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851).
8. Id. at 49-51. Although Officer Killen followed the complainant into her apart-
ment, according to complainant's testimony she believed that he was going to remain
outside near his vehicle. Id.
9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 51.
11. Killen, 680 A.2d at 852. This was supposedly the only force that Officer Killen
used during the entire alleged rape incident. Id.
12. Id. On cross examination, the complainant discussed the details of the encoun-
ter leading to the incident at issue. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol I-B at 99, Com-
monwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851). Allegedly, Officer Killen
also started rubbing the complainant's leg and telling her "how good we would be together
again." Id. At trial, the testimony of a third person also revealed that Officer Killen
confessed to rubbing the complainant's legs and touching her breasts. Killen, 680 A.2d at
852 n.3. Officer Killen contended, however, that the complainant acted as the aggressor.
Id. at 853.
13. Killen, 680 A.2d at 852. The complainant testified that Officer Killen "placed
his hand on the back of her head and directed her toward his penis." Id.
954
1997 Commonwealth v. Killen 955
ceased attempting to engage in sexual activity, pulled up his
slacks and left the apartment.
14
Later that evening, Officer Killen allegedly returned to the
complainant's apartment, stood in the doorway to her bedroom,
then left the apartment and drove away.15 After Officer Killen
left the second time, the complainant walked downstairs to a
neighbor's apartment, told the neighbor that she had been raped
and passed out.' 6 The neighbor subsequently called an ambu-
lance and the complainant was transported to a hospital.'
7
At trial, Officer Killen sought to introduce statements made by
the complainant to a paramedic who transported her to the hos-
pital and to the physician who examined her in order to impeach
the complainant's credibility. 8 In general, the statements con-
sisted of sexually forward and explicit remarks.' 9 Officer Killen
also sought to introduce other evidence, including statements
allegedly made by the complainant to other individuals after the
alleged rape incident, in order to refute the complainant's allega-
tion of attempted rape.2 °
14. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol I-B at 62-63, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851). Although Officer Killen stopped engaging in sexual
advances at some point during the evening, the complainant testified that Officer Killen
stated he would return the next day at 6:00 p.m. Id.
15. Id. at 64-65. The complainant testified that she knew Officer Killen had left
the apartment and returned at a later time because the second time Officer Killen left,
she watched him leave in an unmarked, red automobile. Id.
16. Killen, 680 A.2d at 852.
17. Id. Two paramedics, Larndo "Tooney" Hedrick and Ted Acker, transported the
complainant to Meadville Medical Center. Memorandum and Order at 3, Commonwealth
v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (1996XNo. 1992-851). At trial, the defense asked the complainant
whether she recalled the paramedics or any conversation between herself and the
paramedics. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol. I-B at 135, Commonwealth v. Killen,
680 A.2d 851 (1986) (No. 1992-851). The complainant remembered that two paramedics,
one black individual and one white individual, transported her to Meadville Medical
Center. Id. The complainant further remembered being asked whether she was a dia-
betic; to which she responded that she had low sugar. Id. However, the complainant
remembered no further discussion with either paramedic. Id.
18. Killen, 680 A.2d at 853. Officer Killen's attorney obtained a statement from
Hedrick. Appellant's Brief at 11, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No.
1992-851). According to that statement, the complainant said, "[ils it true, you know,
what I hear about black men," and "[clan you tell me why the hair on a white woman's
vagina is the same as the hair on a black man's head?" Killen, 680 A.2d at 853.
19. Killen, 680 A.2d at 853.
20. Id. According to Dr. Martin, the emergency room physician, the complainant
displayed signs that she had not been raped, such as her flirtatious behavior, jovial mood
and vocalness. Id. Dr. Martin allegedly witnessed the complainant's sexually forward
behavior at the hospital. Id. Testimony of Dr. Martin and several emergency room
nurses would have revealed that the complainant "made some advances toward Dr. Mar-
tin." Appellant's Brief at 12, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-
851) (No. 1992-851). Dr. Martin would also have testified that the complainant displayed
signs that she, not Officer Killen, initiated the sexual activity. Killen, 680 A.2d at 853;
Appellant's Brief at 12, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851).
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The trial court barred the admission of all the statements on
the ground that admission of such evidence violated the Rape
Shield Law.21 Subsequently, a jury convicted Officer Killen of
attempted involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent
assault and official oppression.22
Officer Killen moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial
court's refusal to admit the complainant's statements constituted
harmful error and denied him the opportunity to present an ade-
quate defense.23 In a memorandum opinion, the trial court
denied Officer Killen a rehearing, finding that the statements in
issue were protected under the Rape Shield Law since they
referred to past sexual conduct of an alleged rape victim and
The defense sought to introduce the paramedics' and doctor's testimony in order
to attack the complainant's credibility. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol. I-B at 304-09,
Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851). The defense contended
that the prosecution portrayed the complainant as a frightened individual who did not
speak throughout the incident. Id. at 305-07. By introducing the testimony of the
paramedics and the doctor, the defense could attack the complainant's credibility by
showing that she was acting jovial, laughing in response to her own comments and mak-
ing sexually forward comments after the alleged rape (such as telling Dr. Martin that he
was not a bad looking doctor). Id. at 308. During an in camera hearing, however, the
trial court determined that the testimony related to prior sexual conduct and was there-
fore inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law. Appellant's Reproduced Record Vol. I-B at
302-03, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996) (No. 1992-851). Thus, the
defense could neither question the complainant about the statements she allegedly made
to the paramedics and doctor, nor could the paramedics or doctor testify concerning these
statements. Id.
21. Memorandum and Order at 7, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa.
1996) (No. 1992-851). The Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law is located at 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. § 3104(a) (1995), and provides as follows:
Evidence of Victim's Sexual Conduct. General rule - Evidence of specific instances
of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim's
past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual
conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this chapter except evidence
of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the
alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the
rules of evidence.
Id.
22. Killen, 680 A.2d at 853.
23. Memorandum and Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa.
1996) (No. 1992-851). The defense alleged that the trial court erred in seven separate
points, including: 1) error by refusing to allow Ted Acker, Larndo Hedrick and Dr. Robert
Martin to testify concerning the complainant's behavior shortly after the alleged incident;
2) error by refusing to allow the defense to properly cross examine Detective Lout-
zenhiser; 3) error by refusing to allow the defense to properly cross examine the complain-
ant; 4) error in refusing to grant a demurrer as to the criminal attempt count; 5) error by
not granting the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; 6)
error in not granting the defendant's motion to disallow Detective Loutzenhiser's testi-
mony concerning Officer Killen's alleged confession; and 7) error by refusing to disallow
testimony that included allegations that Officer Killen made noninculpatory statements.
Commonwealth v. Killen
were directed at an individual other than the defendant. 24
Importantly, the trial court found the phrase "past sexual con-
duct" to include any of the complainant's conduct occurring prior
to the trial.25 Therefore, even though the statements in issue
were made after the alleged incident between Officer Killen and
the complainant, they constituted inadmissible evidence.26
As to Officer Killen's contention that a defendant can intro-
duce evidence protected by the Rape Shield Law to attack the
alleged victim's credibility, the trial court concluded that such
evidence is properly admitted into trial only when there is proof
that the alleged victim is hostile towards or holds a bias against
the defendant. 27 The trial court then determined that since no
evidence existed in this case to establish such a bias, the state-
ments in issue could not be introduced for the purpose of attack-
ing the complainant's credibility.2
Officer Killen appealed the case to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. 9 Subsequently,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in the case. 3°
On appeal, the supreme court determined whether the Rape
Shield Law bars from admission at trial an alleged rape victim's
sexually provocative statements, made during or shortly after
the alleged rape and evidencing her state of mind, when such
evidence is offered for the purpose of attacking and impeaching
the alleged victim's credibility.3'
The court opined that statements made during or shortly after
an alleged rape by the victim are not barred from admission at
24. Id. at 4. The trial court held that "statements of solicitation directed at third
persons have been held to be sexual conduct capable of exclusion under the Rape Shield
Law.... [W]e believe that the conduct of the victim in the instant case is sexual conduct
capable of exclusion under the Rape Shield Law." Id.
25. Id. The trial court stated that the Rape Shield Law "prohibits the admission of
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, which both pre-dates and post-dates
the incident for which the defendant is on trial." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4-7. The trial court determined that a court should properly admit evi-
dence, otherwise protected by the Rape Shield Law, when the defense seeks to introduce
the evidence to show that the alleged victim held a bias against the defendant or was
hostile toward the defendant, as this provides evidence that the victim could have
fabricated the story. Id.
28. Memorandum and Order at 4-7, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (Pa.
1996) (No. 1992-851).
29. Commonwealth v. Killen, 645 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court issued a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court's holding
and noting that the trial court properly excluded the testimony under the Rape Shield
Law. Memorandum and Order at 7, Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851 (1996XNo.
1992-851). The court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded that the testimony remained more prejudicial than probative. Id.




trial by the Rape Shield Law simply because the statements are
sexually provocative. 32 Rather, the Rape Shield Law is designed
only to prohibit the admission of evidence at trial that proves the
alleged victim acted promiscuously prior to the alleged rape, or
had a reputation of being promiscuous, when such evidence is
offered to establish the alleged victim's consent to sexual inter-
course. 3' The Rape Shield Law does not prohibit, according to
the court, the admission of relevant statements made by the vic-
tim during or shortly after the alleged rape evidencing her state
of mind when offered to impeach the victim's credibility.3 4
The court then found that in this case, the complainant's credi-
bility remained open to impeachment by Officer Killen since she
testified that Officer Killen attempted to rape her.35 The court
further stated that since Officer Killen sought to introduce the
statements at issue for the limited purpose of impeaching the
complainant's credibility, the trial court erred in barring the
statements under the Rape Shield Law.36 Although the state-
ments concerned sexually provocative content, the statements
were admissible in order for the jury to assess the credibility of
the complainant concerning her testimony that she was sexually
assaulted.
37
At common law, an alleged rape victim's reputation for chas-
tity was the central issue in a rape trial.38 In 1887, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature passed a law requiring juries in rape cases
to be instructed that if a statutory rape defendant successfully
attacked the victim's "good repute" at trial, the defendant shall
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The state of mind evidence introduced here directly related to a material
issue, which was whether the complainant had been the victim or the aggressor. Id.
35. Killen, 680 A.2d at 854. Since the credibility of the complainant remained rele-
vant, the trial court "severely restricted [the defense's] ability to present an adequate
defense . . ." when it refused to admit the evidence in question. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Since the statements were made during and shortly after the alleged
attempted rape, they evidenced the complainant's state of mind and the mere fact that
the statements concerned sexual advances by the complainant did not automatically
mean they are barred under the Rape Shield Law. Id.
38. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The court in
Nieves explained:
At common law, evidence of a female rape complainant's general reputation for
morality and chastity was deemed admissible on the issue of consent. The result of
this common law rule was notorious abuse of victim witnesses by aggressive
defense counsel who essentially put the victim on trial.... Rape Shield laws were
intended to end the abuses fostered by the common law rule by limiting the harass-
ing and embarrassing inquiries of defense counsel into irrelevant prior sexual con-
duct of sexual assault complaints.
Nieves, 582 A.2d at 346.
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be found not guilty.3 9 The statutory principle that an alleged
rape victim's poor reputation constituted a defense to the crime
remained valid throughout the late nineteenth century and early
part of the twentieth century.40 Simultaneously, however, Penn-
sylvania case law held that the 1887 statute should not be con-
structed so as to allow the defendant in a rape trial to introduce
evidence of specific acts undertaken by the alleged victim in
order to attack the victim's reputation.4 1 For instance, in Com-
monwealth v. Stewart,'42 the Pennsylvania Superior Court deter-
mined that evidence of the alleged victim's specific past sexual
encounters did not constitute a proper defense to a rape charge.
43
Thus, while a rape defendant could introduce evidence in a rape
trial regarding the victim's reputation for promiscuity, the
defendant could not introduce evidence of the victim's past sex-
ual acts in order to establish consent. 4
During the 1950's, in Commonwealth v. Wink, 45 the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court validated the 1887 statute and held that
attacking an alleged victim's repute at trial constituted a proper
defense to a rape charge. 46 The defendant in Wink had been
charged with rape and sought to introduce an admission by the
victim that she had engaged in sexual intercourse prior to her
sexual relationship with the defendant.'7 The defense sought to
introduce this evidence in order to attack the alleged victim's
repute.48
39. Act No. 69 at 1887, 1887 Pa. Laws 128, repealed by Act No. 375 at 1939, 1939
Pa. Laws 872, 1040. This law specifically provided: "If the jury shall find that such
woman... was not of good repute, and that the carnal knowledge was with her consent,
the defendant shall be acquitted of the felonious rape ..... Id.
40. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 39 A.2d 527 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) for an example
of how this law was used. In Jordan, the defendant was charged with rape and
attempted at trial to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's bad repute for morality
and chastity. Jordan, 39 A.2d at 527.
41. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 168 A. 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
42. 168 A. 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
43. Stewart, 168 A. at 529. In Stewart, the victim's testimony acknowledging that
she engaged in sexual intercourse on several occasions was admitted into evidence not to
demonstrate her reputation, but rather to establish the identity of father of her child. Id.
The court stated that for a jury to find the defendant not guilty, he must attack the vic-
tim's good reputation by introducing evidence concerning her general reputation for chas-
tity and not evidence concerning specific past sexual acts. Id.
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 168 A. 529 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
45. 84 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951).
46. Wink, 84 A.2d at 401.
47. Id. at 400. The defendant in this case met the alleged victim when she started
babysitting for him. Id. The alleged victim eventually lived with the Winks and at one
point, the defendant offered the alleged victim's father seventeen hundred dollars if the




The court held that evidence concerning the specific past sex-
ual conduct of an alleged rape victim was inadmissible at the
rape trial.4 9 The court reasoned that although evidence concern-
ing an alleged victim's past sexual reputation was admissible as
a proper defense to the rape charge, evidence relating. to the spe-
cific past sexual acts of the victim did not constitute a proper
defense. 0 This evidence was inadmissible based on general evi-
dence rules, which allow a party to introduce general reputation
evidence, but not opinion evidence based on specific incidents.5 '
In 1972, the Pennsylvania Legislature again set forth via stat-
ute that an attack on an alleged rape victim's sexual reputation
was a proper defense to a rape charge.52 Four years later, how-
ever, the legislature replaced the 1972 statute with the Rape
Shield Law,53 under which a rape defendant is not allowed to
defend a rape charge by attacking the alleged victim's sexual rep-
utation.54 Pursuant to the Rape Shield Law, opinion and reputa-
tion evidence regarding an alleged rape victim is not admissible
at the rape trial to prove the alleged victim's consent.55 Rather,
such evidence is barred from admission so that the trial does not
become an attack on the victim's sexual reputation and past sex-
ual encounters.5 6
The first significant rape case after the passage of the Rape
Shield Law was Commonwealth v. Folino.57 In Folino, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the Rape
Shield Law bars the introduction of evidence showing that an
49. Id.
50. Id. The superior court held that "it is the repute of the alleged victim which
constitutes a defense to the felony [of rape], and not her acts." Id.
51. Wink, 84 A.2d at 401. The court found that both Pennsylvania case law and
statutory law make a distinction between opinion and reputation evidence. Id. Thus,
specific prior acts are inadmissible, while overall reputation evidence, or evidence con-
cerning the alleged victim's good repute, is admissible. Id.
52. Act 334 of 1972, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482, 1529, amended by Act 53 of 1976, 1976
Pa. Laws 120, 121. This statute provided:
It is a defense to prosecution under section 3125 of this title (relating to corruption
of minors) and section 3126(5) of this title (relating to indecent assault) for the
actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged victim had, prior
to the time of the offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with
others.
Id.
53. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3104 (1995). See supra note 21 for the specific statutory
language of the Rape Shield Law.
54. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104 (1995).
55. Id.
56. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The enact-
ment of rape shield laws by many states and the federal government is an attempt to
rectify abuses of irrelevant, embarrassing and harassing inquiries of the alleged victim
during rape cases. Id.
57. 439 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
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alleged rape victim approached another individual to solicit sex-
ual intercourse shortly before the defendant approached the vic-
tim. 58 The victims in Folino, two minor girls, had allegedly been
forced into an automobile by the defendant and subsequently
raped at an unidentified house.59 At trial, the defendant sought
to introduce evidence that the alleged victims solicited sexual
intercourse from another individual before the defendant
approached them.60 The defendant sought to introduce this evi-
dence in order to impeach the victims' testimony and to establish
a "continuing course of conduct."61 The prosecution argued, and
the trial court held, that any evidence of the alleged victim's past
sexual conduct with third parties was barred under the Rape
Shield Law. 2
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court strictly inter-
preted the language of the Rape Shield Law and prohibited the
introduction of the proffered evidence. 63 The court reasoned that
the Rape Shield Law absolutely bars evidence concerning an
alleged rape victim's past sexual conduct from admission at trial
unless the conduct occurred with the defendant. 4 Pursuant to
the court's opinion, such evidence may not even be admitted to
establish the alleged victim's bias against the defendant.6 5 Thus,
the court found that under the facts of Folino, evidence concern-
ing the alleged victims' earlier sexual solicitation of an individual
other than the defendant was inadmissible at trial for the pur-
pose of impeaching the victims' credibility.66
Two years later in Commonwealth v. Majorana,6 7 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court determined whether the Rape Shield
Law bars admission of testimony establishing that the defendant
and alleged victim engaged in consensual sexual intercourse sev-
58. Folino, 439 A.2d at 149-51.
59. Id. at 147. The alleged victims allegedly ran away from their homes in
McKeesport to Point Park in Pittsburgh. Id. The defendant approached the alleged vic-
tims and bought them a meal. Id.
60. Id. at 149-50.
61. Id. The trial court was not persuaded by defense counsel's attempt to carve out
exceptions to the Rape Shield Law. Id.
62. Id.
63. Folino, 439 A.2d at 150. The court opined that in accordance with Common-
wealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), even a limited use of evidence of
prior sexual conduct in order to impeach, show bias or demonstrate a continuing course of
conduct is prohibited by the Rape Shield Law. Id.
64. Id. The superior court stated that the only time evidence of past sexual activity
could be admitted in order to establish consent at a rape trial is when the evidence dem-
onstrates past sexual activity with the defendant. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 470 A.2d 80 (Pa. 1983).
1997 961
Duquesne Law Review
eral hours before the alleged rape." The defendant sought to
introduce such evidence in Majorana to provide an alternative
explanation for objective evidence indicating that he was guilty
of the rape.6 9 The prosecution argued that since the sexual con-
duct occurred before the alleged incident, such evidence was
barred under the Rape Shield Law as past sexual conduct.7 °
The court held that the Rape Shield Law did not bar the
defendant's testimony since it provided an alternative theory to
the prosecution's objective evidence supporting the rape charge.7'
With respect to the Rape Shield Law, the court specifically found
that it does not bar evidence from admission at trial directly con-
tradicting a rape charge when such evidence is offered for the
limited purpose of explaining the objective signs of sexual inter-
course between the alleged victim and defendant.72 The court
determined that the legislature did not intend the Rape Shield
Law to prohibit objective evidence concerning consensual sexual
intercourse between the defendant and the alleged victim from
admission at trial, particularly if the evidence negates other evi-
dence offered by the prosecution in support of the rape charge.73
In Commonwealth v. Black,74 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
considered whether the Rape Shield Law bars from admission at
trial evidence that an alleged rape victim engaged in sexual
intercourse with someone other than the defendant, for which
the victim was subsequently reprimanded by the defendant, for
the purpose of establishing the victim's bias and hostility against
the defendant and reason for accusing him of rape.75 In Black,
68. Majorana, 470 A.2d at 82. Defense counsel sought to introduce evidence that
the co-defendant and the alleged victim went for a walk earlier in the evening and
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Id.
69. Id. The Commonwealth had introduced evidence that semen, found in the vic-
tim's vagina, matched the semen of the defendant. Id. In Majorana, the victim testified
that the defendant allegedly forced her into a car driven by a friend of the defendant. Id.
The victim further testified that the defendant raped her as the defendant's friend drove.
Id.
70. Id. Pursuant to the Rape Shield Law, the trial court sustained the Common-
wealth's objection to introducing evidence of consensual intercourse occurring before the
alleged rape. Id. The court allowed admission only of evidence of sexual intercourse that
occurred during the alleged rape. Id.
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. The court agreed with the dissenting opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which stated that because the sexual conduct evidence that the defendant wished
to introduce occurred only two hours prior to the alleged incident, the sexual conduct
evidence did not constitute a past act. Id. Furthermore, the sexual conduct evidence
remained relevant in order to "rebut [the victim's] version of the act of intercourse and as
an explanation for the existence of the sperm in [the victim's] vagina." Id.
73. Majorana, 470 A.2d at 84-85.
74. 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
75. Black, 487 A.2d at 399-401.
Vol. 35:953962
Commonwealth v. Killen
the alleged victim accused her father of rape shortly after he rep-
rimanded and threw her brother out of the home for having sex-
ual intercourse with her.7 6 At trial, the defendant sought to
introduce evidence showing that because he threw the victim's
brother out of the house for having sexual intercourse with her,
the victim held a bias towards him." The trial court found the
proffered evidence of past sexual conduct inadmissable under the
Rape Shield Law.78
On appeal, the superior court found that the defendant's repri-
mand and eviction of his son could have prompted the victim to
seek revenge against him, thus establishing the victim's bias
against the defendant and reason to accuse him of rape.79 The
court then reasoned that since this bias may have existed,
defense counsel could properly cross-examine the alleged victim
at trial concerning her sexual relationship with her brother in
order to establish the bias.' The court opined that although the
Rape Shield Law is designed to protect an alleged rape victim
from public humiliation resulting from the exposure of evidence
concerning past sexual conduct, a defendant's right to confront
the alleged victim concerning her possible bias against him, pro-
tected under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, exceeds the victim's rights under the Rape Shield Law."'
In the 1985 case of Commonwealth v. Dear,2 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the Black decision
altered the Rape Shield Law's general prohibition against
allowing evidence concerning an alleged rape victim's past sexual
conduct to be admitted at trial for the purpose of establishing
consent.a3 The court also considered whether this general rule, if
not altered or overruled by Black, denies a defendant his or her
76. Id. at 398. The victim filed the rape allegation with the court approximately
three months after the alleged incident occurred, which was around the same time the
defendant father engaged in heated discussion with his fifteen year old son. Id.
77. Id. The alleged victim admitted that she wanted her brother back in the home
and that she continued to engage in consensual sexual intercourse with her brother after
he had been thrown out. Id.
78. Id. at 399. The trial court found that the Rape Shield Law absolutely barred
admission of any evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct unless the past sexual con-
duct occurred with the defendant. Id.
79. Id. at 398-99.
80. Black, 487 A.2d at 398-99.
81. Id. at 400. The court analogized Black to an Alaska case, Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), in which an Alaskan statute designed to protect a juvenile by preventing
cross examination of a witness concerning the juvenile's record was held to violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the alleged victim and establish a bias.
Id.
82. 492 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
83. Dear, 492 A.2d at 718-19.
1997 963
Duquesne Law Review
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront an adverse
witness.84
According to the trial court testimony in Dear, the defendant
raped the alleged victim outside a bar where they had met and
talked earlier that evening. 5 At trial, the defendant sought to
introduce evidence that the alleged victim had previously been
convicted of prostitution in order to establish a theory that the
alleged rape incident consisted of consensual sexual intercourse
for compensation.86 The prosecution argued that the evidence
should be barred by the Rape Shield Law because it constituted
past sexual conduct with a third person. 7
The trial court and Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
under the Rape Shield Law, evidence concerning an alleged rape
victim's past sexual conduct introduced for the purpose of estab-
lishing consent is barred from admission at trial8 8 The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court reasoned that the Black decision did not
alter this general rule, but rather only carved out a limited
exception to the Rape Shield Law prohibition. 9 Specifically, the
Black exception allows a defendant to introduce evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct when used for the limited purpose of
establishing the victim's bias against the defendant.9"
By comparing Black with Dear, the court made two important
determinations. First, the introduction of a victim's past sexual
conduct to demonstrate a bias is an exception to the Rape Shield
Law.91 Second, Black held that evidence of prior sexual conduct,
offered to prove a victim's consent is inadmissible under the Rape
Shield Law.92
The Dear court also concluded that a rape defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront his or her alleged victim concern-
84. Id. at 716, 718.
85. Id. at 715. The defendant allegedly approached the victim after she left the
bar, at which point he forced the victim into an alley and raped her. Id.
86. Id. at 716. Defense counsel sought to introduce the alleged victim's prior crimi-
nal record in an attempt to show that she was convicted of prostitution. Id.
87. Id. The prosecution argued that the alleged victim's prior criminal record of
convictions of criminal solicitation in prostitution should be barred because such evidence
was evidence of past sexual conduct. Id.
88. Dear, 492 A.2d at 716. The trial court determined that the Rape Shield Law
was designed to prevent the victim from being placed on trial. Id. The court was unwill-
ing to shift the focus of the trial to the alleged victim's prior sexual encounters with indi-
viduals other than the defendant. Id. Rather, the court noted that the focus of the trial
would remain on whether the defendant raped the alleged victim. Id. Thus, the court
prohibited any records of prior convictions regarding prostitution from admission at trial.
Id.
89. Id.
90. Black, 487 A.2d at 399, 401.




ing the victim's past sexual conduct is clearly outweighed by the
state's interest in shielding the victim from having his or her rep-
utation and past conduct exploited during a rape case.93 The
Commonwealth's interest in excluding past sexual conduct evi-
dence derives from the fact that such evidence has little proba-
tive value as to whether the alleged victim consented to the
conduct at issue. 4 Furthermore, the exclusion of such evidence
from admission at trial protects a rape victim from harassment
and encourages other rape victims to report the crimes without
fear of a later rape trial that focuses on and exploits his or her
past sexual conduct.9
In Commonwealth v. Dickerson,6 the Common Pleas Court of
Delaware County addressed the issue of whether the Rape
Shield Law prohibits the admission of evidence concerning an
alleged rape victim's sexual conduct occurring after the alleged
rape. The alleged victim in Dickerson testified at trial that
after the defendant raped her, she went to her boyfriend's apart-
ment where she subsequently had sexual intercourse with her
boyfriend. 8 The defendant sought to use this evidence to attack
the victim's credibility and prove that she was not raped, but
rather consented to the sexual intercourse.99
The court held that the Rape Shield Law prohibits the intro-
duction of any evidence dealing with an alleged rape victim's sex-
ual conduct occuring after the alleged rape.100 The court opined
that "past sexual conduct," for purpose of the Rape Shield Law, is
sexual conduct occurring anytime prior to trial, including con-
duct occurring before or after the alleged rape. 10 1
93. Id. at 718. The court determined that the defendant's only interest in introduc-
ing evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct was to create an inference that since she
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse in the past, she engaged in consensual inter-
course during the incident at issue. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The Commonwealth argued that its substantial interest in encouraging a
rape victim to report a rape outweighs the defendant's interest in creating an unsup-
ported inference that the victim consented to the incident at issue. Id.
96. 4 Pa. D.& C. 4th 297, 302 (1989), affd. 564 A.2d 1002 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
97. Dickerson, 4 Pa. D.& C. 4th at 302.
98. Id. at 299-302. The victim was allegedly raped after she was abducted at knife-
point. Id. The alleged victim and her boyfriend engaged in sexual intercourse before
reporting the alleged rape to the police. Id. at 301-02.
99. Id. at 306
100. Id. at 304-06. -The court stated that the evidence in issue proved that the vic-
tim sought comfort from her boyfriend, but did not prove that the victim either held a bias
against the defendant or consented to sexual intercourse. Id. at 307-09.
101. Id. The court stated, "[wie see no logical reason to restrict the meaning of the




In the 1989 case of Commonwealth v. Miller,1°2 the Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County addressed the issue of
whether the Rape Shield Law prohibits defense counsel from
introducing evidence at a rape trial establishing that the alleged
victim previously stated her first sexual encounter occurred after
the alleged rape.10 3 The defense sought to introduce such evi-
dence in Miller to impeach the alleged victim's credibility. 10 4 The
prosecution stated that if the defense pursued such inquiry, the
alleged victim would respond to the inquiry by stating that she
did not consider the alleged rape to be her first sexual encounter
because it was not consensual. 10 5
The court found that the contested evidence would not suffi-
ciently impeach the victim's testimony, reveal the victim's bias
against the defendant or provide the victim with a motive to
falsely accuse the defendant. 0 6 Moreover, the court concluded
that the victim's planned response to the contested inquiry would
have an extremely prejudicial effect on the defendant. 0 7 Conse-
quently, the court found the evidence to constitute past sexual
conduct and thus barred from admission at trial under the Rape
Shield Law. 08
In Commonwealth v. Nieves, s09 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant must offer a
specific incident of an alleged rape victim's past sexual conduct to
establish objective evidence establishing the defendant's inno-
cence in a rape case. 110 In Nieves, the prosecution introduced
medical records to prove that the alleged victim contracted gon-
orrhea from the defendant when he raped her."' The defendant
then attempted to introduce evidence regarding the alleged vic-
tim's past sexual conduct to rebut the theory that she contracted
gonorrhea from him."2 The defendant did not identify any spe-
102. 4 Pa. D.& C. 4th 652 (1989).
103. Miller, 4 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 656.
104. Id. at 654.
105. Id. at 657.
106. Id. at 655-57. The court determined that after reviewing Black, the evidence
sought to be introduced did not adequately support a bias and could not be used to
impeach the alleged victim's credibility. Id. at 655.
107. Id.
108. Miller, 4 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 655.
109. 582 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
110. Nieves, 582 A.2d at 346. The defendant argued that the trial court should have
allowed him to blindly cross examine the alleged victim about past sexual conduct in
order to determine whether she could have contracted gonorrhea from someone other
than the defendant. Id.
111. Id. at 343. The court found that the medical records were properly admitted
under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 344-45.
112. Id. at 346.
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cific incident of past sexual conduct, however, in which the
alleged victim would have contracted gonorrhea.
113
The court held that in order to overcome the Rape Shield Law
and introduce the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, the
defendant must offer specific evidence in support of a theory
introduced to contradict or detract from objective evidence impli-
cating the defendant in the rape." 4 The court then concluded
that since the defendant in this case did not adequately establish
an alternative specific incident establishing that the alleged vic-
tim contracted gonorrhea from someone else, the Rape Shield
Law prohibited the defendant's introduction of the victim's prior
sexual activity at trial. "'
In Commonwealth v. Spiewak,"6 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether past sexual conduct evi-
dence could be introduced to attack an alleged rape victim's cred-
ibility by showing that she previously referred to another
individual as the person who sexually abused her." 7 In Spiewak,
the prosecution argued that the stepfather of the alleged rape
victim engaged in involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with
her before her sixteenth birthday."18 In response, the defendant
sought to introduce evidence establishing that the alleged victim
previously testified at a custody hearing that she actually
engaged in the sexual activity with another man."9 The defend-
ant sought to introduce this evidence to establish his inno-
113. Id.
114. Id. The superior court stated:
The Rape Shield law will bow to a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
when a specific proffer demonstrates that the proposed inquiry is intended to elicit
relevant evidence, which is more probative than prejudicial, and which is not
cumulative of other evidence available without encroaching upon Rape Shield law
protections.
Id. at 347. Additionally, the court stated that in order to admit evidence under the Rape
Shield Law, "the evidence must be relevant; must be more probative than prejudicial; and
may not be merely cumulative of other unprivileged impeachment or rebuttal evidence."
Id.
115. Nieves, 582 A.2d at 347. In Majorana and Black, the defendants offered spe-
cific incidents for which the proffered evidence concerning past sexual conduct was rele-
vant to establish an alternative explanation to objective evidence establishing that they
were guilty of the crime. Compare Majorana, 470 A.2d at 82, 84, and Black, 487 A.2d at
398-99, with Nieves, 582 A.2d at 347.
116. 617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992).
117. Spiewak, 617 A.2d at 697.
118. Id. The defendant admitted to engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim,
his stepdaughter. Id. The defendant stated, however, that they did not engage in sexual
intercourse until after she was sixteen years old. Id. In Pennsylvania, sexual intercourse
with a female under sixteen years of age is defined as involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3123 (1995).
119. Spiewak, 617 A.2d at 698. The prosecution did not ask, and the victim did not
testify, as to whom that man was. Id.
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cence. 120 The trial court agreed with the prosecution and held
that such evidence could not be admitted at trial because the
Rape Shield Law is an absolute bar to the introduction of evi-
dence concerning the victim's past sexual conduct. 12
1
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
Rape Shield Law was not designed to exclude evidence from
admission at a rape trial that may "exculpate" the defendant of
the sexual offense. 122 Rather, testimony evidencing the alleged
victim's past sexual conduct, offered by the defendant for the pur-
pose of denying the alleged rape, is admissible if it is relevant to
a material fact and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect."a The court then found that the evidence in this case was
relevant to a material issue because it tended to make the
alleged rape victim's allegation against her stepfather less
believable. 124 Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence
outweighed its prejudicial effect upon the victim. 125 The court
noted that without introducing the evidence in question, a jury
would infer that it was the defendant, not another individual,
with whom the alleged victim testified to have previously
engaged in sexual intercourse. 126
The court also found that the Rape Shield Law cannot be
mechanically applied because, as in this case, a mechanical
application would deny the defendant his constitutional right to
confront the alleged victim under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.127 The court specifically stated that
120. Id. Factually similar testimony was offered at both the custody hearing, con-
cerning the sexual encounters with the other man (an older man), and at the defendant's
trial, concerning the sexual encounters with the defendant. Id. Consequently, the
defendant sought to introduce the alleged victim's allegations of sexual misconduct with
the other man as evidence that he, and not the defendant, committed the crime. Id. at
699.
121. Id. at 698 n.1.
122. Id. at 698.
123. Id. at 699-700.
124. Spiewak, 617 A.2d at 699. Since the testimony implicated someone other than
the defendant, a reasonable person could find that the alleged victim was in fact not sexu-
ally abused by the defendant. Id.
125. Id. at 700. Given the alleged victim's testimony concerning the "older man,"
the probative value of defense counsel's cross-examination concerning the identity of the
"older man" as someone other than the defendant materially related to the defendant's
right to present a full defense. Id.
126. Id. at 698.
127. Id. at 701. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that although the legislative
aims of the Rape Shield Law are admirable, denying the defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the alleged victim concerning evidence that is extremely relevant and reli-




a mechanical application of the Rape Shield Law would unfairly
result in this law being used as both a shield and a sword.
128
In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 12 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided the issue of whether an accusation by the alleged
victim's boyfriend of her infidelity was "so closely tied" to the vic-
tim's actual past sexual conduct as to be barred from admission
at trial under the Rape Shield Law. 130  The defendant in
Berkowitz allegedly raped the victim after she entered the
defendant's dorm room looking for his roommate.' 3' At the rape
trial, in order to establish the victim's consent to the sexual
intercourse, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the
victim's boyfriend previously accused the victim of being unfaith-
ful.' 32 The prosecution argued that such evidence was
inadmissable because it was used to establish consent and thus
barred under the Rape Shield Law. 13
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the proffered
evidence exemplified the type of evidence that the Rape Shield
Law was designed to exclude.'3 The court held that the purpose
behind the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a rape case from turn-
ing into an attack on the victim's past sexual conduct and reputa-
tion.3M According to the court, a rape defendant's attempt to
introduce evidence that the alleged victim's boyfriend previously
accused her of being promiscuous is the same as an attempt to
introduce evidence regarding the alleged victim's past sexual
conduct or reputation. 36 Consequently, the Rape Shield Law
barred the contested evidence in this case from admission at
trial.137
Generally, evidence concerning a rape victim's past sexual con-
duct or reputation is barred from admission at a rape trial when
it is introduced to establish the victim's consent to the alleged
rape. The historical application of Pennsylvania's Rape Shield
Law illustrates, however, that evidence concerning the past sex-
128. Id. at 702.
129. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
130. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
131. Id. at 1163. After the incident, the defendant stated, "[wow, I guess we just
got carried away," to which she responded, "[no, we didn't get carried away, you got car-
ried away." Id.
132. Id. at 1165.
133. Id. at 1163, 1165.
134. Id. Specifically, the type of evidence that the Rape Shield Law is designed to
exclude is evidence that the alleged victim had previously engaged in sexual conduct with
someone other than the defendant. Id. Thus, accusations that the alleged victim had
been unfaithful are the same as such evidence. Id.
135. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163, 1165.




ual conduct of an alleged rape victim is not barred from admis-
sion at trial by the Rape Shield Law when the evidence is
introduced to either: 1) support the victim's bias against the
defendant and thus the victim's reason for accusing the defend-
ant of the crime;138 2) provide an alternative theory for objective
evidence supporting the rape allegation and thereby suggest that
the alleged victim consensually engaged in sexual intercourse
with the defendant; 139 or 3) attack the victim's credibility.
140
Importantly, though, specific evidence in support of any of these
uses for the past sexual conduct evidence must be produced in
order for such evidence to be admissible. Moreover, if the evi-
dence of past sexual conduct is not barred because of an excep-
tion to the Rape Shield Law, the probative value of the evidence
must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly decided in Com-
monwealth v. Killen'4' that the Rape Shield Law does not
exclude evidence of an alleged rape victim's sexual conduct occur-
ring either during or shortly after the alleged rape when the evi-
dence is relevant to the issues at trial. The intent of the Rape
Shield Law is only to exclude evidence concerning the alleged vic-
tim's irrelevant past sexual conduct or reputation when such evi-
dence is introduced to establish the victim's consent to the
alleged crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Killen con-
cluded that the phrase "past sexual conduct" includes evidence
concerning only the alleged victim's sexual activity occuring
prior to the alleged rape.142 The Rape Shield Law does not
exclude evidence concerning the activities that occurred during
or shortly after the alleged incident, particularly when offered to
establish the alleged victim's state of mind during the incident.
An alleged victim's sexual conduct occurring during or shortly
after the incident ("present sexual conduct") remains relevant
and admissible in a rape trial for several reasons. First, the
alleged victim's actions during or shortly after the incident pres-
ent an overall picture of how the events transpired and may
138. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of past sexual
conduct evidence introduced to establish the victim's bias. See also Black, 487 A.2d at
399-401.
139. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of past sexual
conduct evidence introduced to establish an alternative theory to objective evidence sup-
porting the rape allegation. See also Majorana, 470 A.2d at 84.
140. See supra notes 116-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of past sexual
conduct evidence introduced to attack the victim's credibility. See also Spiewak, 617 A.2d
at 699.
141. 680 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1996).
142. Killen, 680 A.2d at 854.
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establish the alleged victim's consent to the sexual intercourse.143
Second, such evidence provides a basis for determining the
alleged victim's state of mind during the incident.
4 4
Allowing evidence pertaining to an alleged victim's "present
sexual conduct" to be admitted into evidence in a rape trial is not
necessarily an attack on his or her chastity or reputation, even
though the evidence may be used to illustrate that the victim
consented to the sexual intercourse. Rather, the evidence pro-
vides a basis for determining what actually happened at the time
in question. In Killen, the complainant stated that Officer Killen
attempted to rape her; however, "present sexual conduct" evi-
dence existed tending to prove that the complainant was the
aggressor and that following the alleged attack, she acted unlike
an individual who had been raped. 145 This evidence was relevant
to the issues at trial because it could be used to test the com-
plainant's credibility and aid the defendant in setting forth an
adequate defense."4
One should not interpret Killen to mean that evidence of an
alleged rape victim's sexual conduct occurring during or after the
alleged rape is admissible at trial even if such evidence has no
probative value. Rather, it should be recognized that defense
counsel in a rape case is still required to present a persuasive
reason as to why such evidence is relevant to the case. Moreover,
the defense's reasoning for presenting the evidence must be
based on more than a general theory that the evidence should be
admitted simply because the conduct occurred during or after the
incident.
In conclusion, the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Killen does not allow evidence of past sexual conduct to be
introduced in a rape trial in order to establish the alleged vic-
tim's consent. Rather, Killen allows relevant evidence concern-
ing sexual conduct which occurred during or shortly after the
143. Id.
144. Without introducing an alleged victim's "present sexual conduct," his or her
testimony can portray a completely inaccurate picture of the incident at issue that the
defense cannot correct or dispel since it would be provided with no recourse.
145. Killen, 680 A.2d at 852-53.
146. While an unsupported correlation exists when a defendant seeks to introduce
evidence regarding an alleged rape victim's past sexual conduct to establish consent dur-
ing the alleged rape incident ("present consent"), evidence of an alleged victim's "present
sexual conduct" can establish that an alleged victim consented to or was the aggressor
during the alleged incident. In Killen, the defendant's evidence was not offered to estab-
lish consent by introducing evidence of past sexual conduct; rather, the evidence attacked
the victim's credibility by introducing present sexual conduct that suggested the victim
acted in a manner inconsistent with one who had recently been a victim of an attempted
rape. Killen, 680 A.2d at 854. Although the evidence may have inadvertently established
consent, the evidence presented "present sexual conduct," not "past sexual conduct."
1997
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alleged incident to be introduced in order to demonstrate the
alleged victim's state of mind during the incident. Consequently,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not in any way compromise
or jeopardize the importance and meaning of the Rape Shield
Law.
Brian J. Golias
